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sons the majority cites to buttress its holding have no foundation in the law.
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science of embryo stem cells and examines the medical promise that stem cell technol-
ogy holds. It also briefly addresses the controversy that surrounds embryo stem cells.
The Note then looks at why federal funding is so important to embryo stem cell re-
search and how federal funding for embryo stem cell research is currently handled.
Examination of current federal funding methodology leads to several concerns which
are addressed, including property rights, flight of scientists to greener pastures, limited
diversity of embryo stem cell lines, and xenotransplantation issues. The Note con-
cludes that while the current approach to federal funding of embryo stem cell research
is a step in the right direction, it still needs to be broadened. If American taxpayers
are going to fund embryo stem cell research, it should be done it a way that allows
those taxpayers to reap the maximum benefit from the research.
REMOVING THE BLINDERS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE AS A PROPER
DEPARTURE GROUND Kelly M. Neff 445
Although the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have strived to standardize the sen-
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dant's sentence. Many defendants have argued that their cultural beliefs, which may
tend to mitigate their mens rea or probability of recidivism, render them distinct from
the average offender of the particular crime and therefore should be considered as a
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